Monday, July 19, 2010

First Philosophy

I'm not sure I am right about this, but I don't believe in first philosophy. And moreover, I'm not sure thinking there is a first philosophy is particularly useful or helpful. I don't have a clear argument about this yet, more just a feeling I have.

Tuesday, July 13, 2010

Life Update

I wanted to wait till I had signed the forms, but you are now reading the blog of the Director of Debate at Mercer University in Macon, GA. This is certainly exciting news for me. Not only is this a chance to do an enjoyable job and academically rich job while avoiding adjunct hell*, but I also believe debate is an important activity and am glad to be able to continue working in that area. I've been involved in competitive academic debate in some form or another for 14 years now, and look forward to this opportunity.

However, it has meant that I've moved again (for the last decade I've moved every summer except one. I'm getting a little tired of it). I also recently had a root canal. That's why things have been and will be a little quite around for a bit.

Anyway, here is a bit of music for the occasion.



*Adjunct hell doesn't refer to all adjuncting. It refers specifically to jobs that do not provide adequate funding and no benefits, and frequently requires teaching many courses across multiple universities.

Thursday, July 8, 2010

A Post of Links

Alphonso Lingis is writing a book about pigeons. Most of you know he wrote a couple of essays (okay, the same essay with different titles) for the early edited collections of continental animal studies books, and I'd like to see more of his work on the animal question.

AAAARG is back up, at a different website. Good for them!

This article on eating synthetic animal flesh is interesting. Hopefully I will more on this later, but I never really get around to doing that when I say I will, so I never said I will write more on this later.

In the Middle has an interesting post on the ways blogging has changed medieval studies. I think this applies to lots of us in the humanities. Well worth the read.

This NY Times article seems to be another in a long line of stories about stopping cheating. It goes through several different means. I never know how I feel on such things. I am certainly part of those who are uncomfortable as enforcer rather than educator, and also who feels sites like turnitin violate students' intellectual rights. On the other hand I tend to teach classes where cheating is hard by their very structure. I might feel differently if I taught different classes.

I was tempted to just completely ignore this recent Chronicle rant against veganism, but I feel the need to raise a few questions. I could spend a while responding to the whole thing, but it is such a poorly written attack against an obvious strawman I don't see the point. If you have things you want responded to, let me know and I will. Otherwise, I am curious why it got printed? This is clearly the sort of thing that should belong to blogs and not to articles. Moreover, why did the author feel the need to write this now? There is nothing in the piece that explains why this article, which contains zero new arguments, is worth being written and read now. Also, make sure to read Peter's brief response.


Lastly, this is another Take Away Show, staring Amanda Palmer covering Jacques Brel's "Amsterdam" (she doesn't actually start singing until about 1:20 into the video). It's really wonderful.

Thursday, July 1, 2010

Speciesism: Some Introductory Thoughts

Speciesism is a term that I mostly stay away from in my own work (more for rhetorical reasons rather than philosophical reasons), however it seems to be, I hate to say misunderstood but certainly understood in a very limited way. This post is to unpack this concept a bit and see if it useful. This post is in many ways inspired by this video featuring Kathy Rudy and Tim Morton:



The term itself was coined by Richard Ryder in 1970 in a privately published pamphlet of the same name, but for the most part was popularized by Peter Singer in his Animal Liberation. Speciesism clearly is supposed to be analogous to terms like racism and sexism (indeed, Singer is upfront that the title of the book is to put the animal movement as the next rational movement after something like Women's Liberation). But in what way is the word analogous? Is it that we don't treat people of color well, and we don't treat women well, and we don't treat animals well, so they are all in the same boat? It's a bit more complicated than that.
For Singer racism, sexism, and speciesism is the irrational exclusion of beings from the moral community, or beings that we do not have to give equal consideration of interests (I grant those aren't exactly the same thing). Speciesism isn't just the philosophical insight of Animal Liberation, but underpins the entire rhetorical economy of the book. It was (and continuous) to be the case that those who are concerned for the well being of animals are seen as sentimental and irrational fools while the good rationalist isn't concerned for animals. Look toward the descriptions of Descartes and his followers awful vivisection of animals, or remember your Spinoza, "The law against killing animals is based more on empty superstitions and unmanly sentiment than sound reason." (E4p37s1) Almost all of Animal Liberation can be read as flipping this traditional economy, with irrationality being put on the side of not caring about animals and sound reason being firmly on the side of an equal consideration of interests for animals. Now, sentimentality being connected with women in our culture construct, Singer's original preface has been rightly and largely panned for some sexist and ageist representations (by the way, the most recent edition of Animal Liberation has removed all the prefaces, including the original one, except for the current preface). I also happen to think that sentiment and affect are philosophically more important than Singer does, but that's not the point right now.
So first speciesism serves a certain rhetorical capacity. Moreover, it seeks to displace species as an ethically essential category. Singer performs this function by arguing from marginal cases. In general we have a series of capacities that we claim all and only humans have, and that all other beings do not have. The problem, of course, is that is not really true. First of all, all sorts of animals have amazing capacities (and honestly, the evidence on this one has only gotten more true in the 35 years since Animal Liberation was first published), the ability for tool use, prohibitions on incest, language, denial and disavowal, the ability to paint and dance to a beat, etc. This something I sort of get into in this post. Not only are other animals really incredible, but there is also a great deal of diversity among humans (this tends to be the so-called marginal cases), and that means most capacities that we want to say are definite traits of humans tend to find humans who either never have that power, or at some point in their life have not had these capacities. So, part of what speciesism does is began to contest the boundaries of species. So, species may be real, but they are hardly given and coherent categories, they are not exactly actual. In this sense it might be better to think of species as something like sex. I think we would all agree that there are real and even important differences among the sexes. At the same time, the duality of sexes is kinda bunk. So, there are a multiplicity of sexes, but the coherency of sex, particularly a coherent duality, is a constructed reality (basically see anything by Anne Fausto-Sterling).
In this sense, the critique of speciesism isn't at all about erasing or ignoring differences or about propping up the human/other duality as is implied in the video above, but rather explodes difference. It is actually because of the level of difference (for example, the differences internal to the category of human, and the differences internal to the category of animal). It is actually because of the proliferation of difference that the critique of speciesism has any steam at all. Even in a thinker like Singer we have an explicit discussion of difference in the formulation of equal consideration of interests. This is not a formulation for equal treatment, for the same treatment and the same laws and all of that, but rather the unique interests of beings should be taken account of equally. Of course for many people who espouse a critique of speciesism there emerges certain questions of what allows one in a moral community, and sometimes a support of animal rights in a formal and legal sense. But none of those discussions are necessary to the critique of speciesism (and in this I have a bit of sympathy for Cary Wolfe, who gets criticized in the above video for supporting animal rights--when he doesn't-- and he gets attacked by certain analytic people for not supporting animal rights-- see The Death of the Animal). A critique of speciesism often creates a certain new community, a certain new commonality, but it doesn't do so through a reduction of difference, but rather through an explosion of difference that undermines the coherency of the very category of species. One last thing I want to deal with here is the relationship of speciesism and racism, because that is a central question in Kathy Rudy and Tim Morton's comments above.
There are any number of thinkers that argue that racism's formulation is fundamentally a question of determining who gets to be human. Think here of Foucault in "Society Must Be Defended", Balibar's work on racism, and the decolonial critique of humanism to be found in Frantz Fanon, Aime Cesaire, Sylvia Wynter, among others. Now, none of these thinkers push their work toward including non-humans into the ethical and political community. Indeed, many of them go on to argue for a new and true and real humanism after just a few pages before calling humanism a hitlerism. But for those of us who critique speciesism, I think you can see a certain conclusion. If racism is deeply and obviously tied to a boundary maintenance of this incoherent category of THE human, why try to fight racism by getting the category of the human right? Empirically, we've not been very good at figuring out what gets to count as human (for a more recent example, are Great Apes and dolphins human?). And if a being gets miscounted, placed as an animal or hybrid or pseudo-human or fully human when they are not, what is the big deal? Unless, of course, some of those are beings we are able to exploit, kill, and violate at will and whim. So, why don't we work toward getting rid of speciesism instead of creating a new humanism?
And that last point is a good one, I think. But I want to move away from things I may have argued in the past. It strikes me that racism can still function even in a world without speciesism. I think such racism would be weakened (and vice versa), but I don't think it is as easy as saying that racism is an extension of the logic of speciesism (or vice versa). These ideologies are certainly entwined, but I think it is important to see them as still discrete.

Tuesday, June 29, 2010

My favorite version of Being and Time.

There was recently a brief multi-blog discussion of everyone's favorite translation of Heidegger's Being and Time. Forgive me for not rounding up the links, this discussion took place a couple of weeks ago. It was occasioned because someone noticed that a new version of Joan Stambaugh's translation (revised with notes from Dennis Schmidt) is coming out. Almost all of the other blogs agreed that the Macquarrie and Robinson translation was their preferred one. That's not surprising, considering they all found the book useful, all spent a lot of time with it, and all started with the M&R translation. I'm one of the few people I know who first read B&T in the Stambaugh translation. But that's not my favorite translation.

My favorite translation is Mark Z. Danielewski's novel House of Leaves. For those that don't know the book, it's like a good rock band that wears all their influences on their sleeves. Sure, those other bands might have been better, and certainly more original, but this band rocks and knows how to have fun. Moreover, HoL is a wonderful parody of academic writing and the standards of the academy. Meanwhile, the book is basically inspired from being to end by Being and Time (along with several other thinkers). Get this, it even shares Heidegger's anthropocentrism and belief that animals can only perish and not die. All of that, plus it is shamelessly self-indulgent, outlandishly funny, and often spooky as hell. I know a couple of posts below I talked of rereading a couple of big books (by Heidegger and Luhmann), but maybe this should be the next big book I reread.

Monday, June 28, 2010

Bennett, ch. 8

Sorry again for running late. Hopefully in the next few days I will have a post on the book in toto. This will be a short one on chapter 8. Also, if you haven't already, read Adrian on the final chapter here and here.

First, let me say I liked this chapter a lot. It's important and interesting. Her arguments for what a vital materialism can bring to the green movement is strong and important (though her object of critique, environmentalism, seems a little unclear to me. But critique isn't the most important thing here). Her criticism of portrayals of nature as harmonious is key here. And it ties into her closing point that we need to be careful of our only environmental maxim being to tread lightly. This image of nature is one where it is passive and perfect until the evil humans come and muck everything up. I doubt highly it is accurate, and probably doesn't help us figure out better models of interaction and communication with everything that isn't human. Rather, echoing the conclusion by Bennett, sometimes we need to tread lightly, and sometimes we need a Bataillian expenditure, and sometimes we need other levels of action. What we need is a Kairos, a sense of time that is bound to action and inaction, to the opportune time. We need an archer's sense of time, a time that cares about hitting our target, and that takes into account all sorts of nonhuman interactions like bows, strings, wind, force and velocity.
While I think it is clear what benefits vitalist materialism brings with it for the green movement, my only worry is the language is filled with far more radical conditions for success. Complete revolutions in relations to ourselves and to others. I am not saying all of that is not needed, but something like cap and trade whose benefit is that it manages a goal without requiring a revolution should not be lost. We cannot be like, "Let's stop cap and trade because it keeps the market system in place!", because such a move would surely be suicidal as well. This too must be kairos, a sense of timing of when to take a revolutionary step, and when to take a reforming step. Deleuze liked to speak of the importance of stammering, but I think stumbling is also a necessity.

Though my favorite part of this chapter was Bennett's defense of anthropomorphism. Adrian wrote on this, but I think it is also one of the things that would seem the most familiar and important to many of the readers of this blog. Bennett argues, "[m]aybe it is worth running the risks associated with anthropomorphizing [...] because it, oddly enough, works against anthropocentrism" (p. 120). I cannot possibly remember the number of times I have said some version of anthropomorphism might not be the worst thing ever. If one is willing to risk anthropomorphism, it is often because anthropocentrism is seen as a greater enemy. However, if you think that human exceptionalism is actually a good thing or a necessary thing, then anthropomorphism would be one of the worst sins you could commit. I'm not sure I want to defend anthropomorphism as always a good thing, but it is certainly a risk I don't mind running. Maybe we can turn to the both familiarizing and de-familiarizing effect of anthropomorphism later, but this stumbling and stammering end seems a good place to end this post.

A Post of Links

Peter has a response up to my most recent comments on Bennett. Major take away point, time for me to reread Heidegger's 29/30 course, which is a big book. It's been about four years since I read it, but mostly I remember the best thing in there was getting me to read Uxekull. I'd also add as awesome as Uxekull is, Heidegger was one of the few philosophers who have been influenced by him that has a decent excuse for not knowing about more current advances biology and zoology. Still, now is a good time to start re-reading it.

Levi also has a response up to my recent comments on Bennett. Major take away point, time for me to reread Luhmann's Social Systems, which is an even bigger book. I think it's been seven years since I read that book cover to cover, and I'm on his side about the importance of Luhmann generally for philosophy.

Adam Merberg has a wonderful post on the idea of nutrient cycling from Michael Pollan. I think it might be time to seriously consider what it was about The Omnivore's Dilemma that made it such a success. Because it certainly wasn't the quality of information contained.

It seems Zer0 books has it's own website now, check it out.

Lastly, here is one of my favorite Take Away Shows, Yeasayer performing a mixture of their "2080" and "Tightrope". Long, but a perfect blend of humor of amazing sound.