My favorite version of Being and Time.

There was recently a brief multi-blog discussion of everyone's favorite translation of Heidegger's Being and Time. Forgive me for not rounding up the links, this discussion took place a couple of weeks ago. It was occasioned because someone noticed that a new version of Joan Stambaugh's translation (revised with notes from Dennis Schmidt) is coming out. Almost all of the other blogs agreed that the Macquarrie and Robinson translation was their preferred one. That's not surprising, considering they all found the book useful, all spent a lot of time with it, and all started with the M&R translation. I'm one of the few people I know who first read B&T in the Stambaugh translation. But that's not my favorite translation.

My favorite translation is Mark Z. Danielewski's novel House of Leaves. For those that don't know the book, it's like a good rock band that wears all their influences on their sleeves. Sure, those other bands might have been better, and certainly more original, but this band rocks and knows how to have fun. Moreover, HoL is a wonderful parody of academic writing and the standards of the academy. Meanwhile, the book is basically inspired from being to end by Being and Time (along with several other thinkers). Get this, it even shares Heidegger's anthropocentrism and belief that animals can only perish and not die. All of that, plus it is shamelessly self-indulgent, outlandishly funny, and often spooky as hell. I know a couple of posts below I talked of rereading a couple of big books (by Heidegger and Luhmann), but maybe this should be the next big book I reread.

Bennett, ch. 8

Sorry again for running late. Hopefully in the next few days I will have a post on the book in toto. This will be a short one on chapter 8. Also, if you haven't already, read Adrian on the final chapter here and here.

First, let me say I liked this chapter a lot. It's important and interesting. Her arguments for what a vital materialism can bring to the green movement is strong and important (though her object of critique, environmentalism, seems a little unclear to me. But critique isn't the most important thing here). Her criticism of portrayals of nature as harmonious is key here. And it ties into her closing point that we need to be careful of our only environmental maxim being to tread lightly. This image of nature is one where it is passive and perfect until the evil humans come and muck everything up. I doubt highly it is accurate, and probably doesn't help us figure out better models of interaction and communication with everything that isn't human. Rather, echoing the conclusion by Bennett, sometimes we need to tread lightly, and sometimes we need a Bataillian expenditure, and sometimes we need other levels of action. What we need is a Kairos, a sense of time that is bound to action and inaction, to the opportune time. We need an archer's sense of time, a time that cares about hitting our target, and that takes into account all sorts of nonhuman interactions like bows, strings, wind, force and velocity.
While I think it is clear what benefits vitalist materialism brings with it for the green movement, my only worry is the language is filled with far more radical conditions for success. Complete revolutions in relations to ourselves and to others. I am not saying all of that is not needed, but something like cap and trade whose benefit is that it manages a goal without requiring a revolution should not be lost. We cannot be like, "Let's stop cap and trade because it keeps the market system in place!", because such a move would surely be suicidal as well. This too must be kairos, a sense of timing of when to take a revolutionary step, and when to take a reforming step. Deleuze liked to speak of the importance of stammering, but I think stumbling is also a necessity.

Though my favorite part of this chapter was Bennett's defense of anthropomorphism. Adrian wrote on this, but I think it is also one of the things that would seem the most familiar and important to many of the readers of this blog. Bennett argues, "[m]aybe it is worth running the risks associated with anthropomorphizing [...] because it, oddly enough, works against anthropocentrism" (p. 120). I cannot possibly remember the number of times I have said some version of anthropomorphism might not be the worst thing ever. If one is willing to risk anthropomorphism, it is often because anthropocentrism is seen as a greater enemy. However, if you think that human exceptionalism is actually a good thing or a necessary thing, then anthropomorphism would be one of the worst sins you could commit. I'm not sure I want to defend anthropomorphism as always a good thing, but it is certainly a risk I don't mind running. Maybe we can turn to the both familiarizing and de-familiarizing effect of anthropomorphism later, but this stumbling and stammering end seems a good place to end this post.

A Post of Links

Peter has a response up to my most recent comments on Bennett. Major take away point, time for me to reread Heidegger's 29/30 course, which is a big book. It's been about four years since I read it, but mostly I remember the best thing in there was getting me to read Uxekull. I'd also add as awesome as Uxekull is, Heidegger was one of the few philosophers who have been influenced by him that has a decent excuse for not knowing about more current advances biology and zoology. Still, now is a good time to start re-reading it.

Levi also has a response up to my recent comments on Bennett. Major take away point, time for me to reread Luhmann's Social Systems, which is an even bigger book. I think it's been seven years since I read that book cover to cover, and I'm on his side about the importance of Luhmann generally for philosophy.

Adam Merberg has a wonderful post on the idea of nutrient cycling from Michael Pollan. I think it might be time to seriously consider what it was about The Omnivore's Dilemma that made it such a success. Because it certainly wasn't the quality of information contained.

It seems Zer0 books has it's own website now, check it out.

Lastly, here is one of my favorite Take Away Shows, Yeasayer performing a mixture of their "2080" and "Tightrope". Long, but a perfect blend of humor of amazing sound.

Flat Ontology, Flat Ethics: More thoughts on Bennett ch. 7

Following up on my last post on chapter 7, this post is mostly a response to Adrian. So make sure to read his first.

Let me begin by agreeing that I find Bennett mostly an ally. If it has come out any other way, let me apologize for being unclear. The disagreements I have with her work, and the limitations I find in it, are real and important. But if everyone shared her beliefs I am pretty sure the world would be a significantly better place (for humans and all sorts of nonhumans). A polity with better channels of communication is something we can all agree is both needed and needs to be worked toward. But differences remain. I love Adrian's description, "At least Bennett and Scu are moving in the same direction, one more hesitantly, trying to keep the laggards on board with her as she proceeds, the other more intently and insistently." Though, the question of hesitation with Bennett is one I am curious of. In describing Bennett as trying to keep the laggards on board, there is a suggestion that maybe her actual beliefs are a bit more radical. That she slows down for the sake of others she is convincing. I assumed the hesitation was her own.

I also agree with Adrian when he says that a flat ontology does not necessitate a flat ethics. Far from it, many people have tended to use the flattening of ontology to reassert human exceptionalism. The most common example for those of us who argue for egalitarianism between those beings who are called The Animal and those beings who are called The Human is a common objection. Aha, says the humanist: What about plants? Sometimes this is a sincere objection, frequently it is the humanist performing a version of Freud's joke about the broken kettle. So, there is a certain type of person who seems to misunderstand ethical vegetarianism and veganism as being about creating a morally innocent way of eating. That concern for plants translates somehow into a criticism of veganism only makes sense if you assume ethics is about innocence. Nothing is innocent to eat, says this type of humanist, so everything is innocent to eat (except humans, for no particular reason)! Ethics is not about finding innocence, but about living after innocence. Ethics is about thinking and living in our postlapsarian world without alibi.

Now, let me be clear, nowhere does Bennett come across as the type of humanist I described in the preceding paragraph. She seems honestly committed to complicating our relationship with the nonhuman. But that is why her random moment of humanism is so odd. It isn't an appeal to not knowing, but rather an appeal to a bit of simplicity. That when it comes to humans they are still top ape. Adrian engages in a few abstract questions of if I have to save an infant or an ant, I save the infant (which after watching Toy Story 3, an amazing movie, raises the question: What would it mean to save a plastic toy vs an infant?), or a slightly more complicated one about electrically shocking people who shock chimps. I agree with Adrian on these. But let's point to a different example. I have two cats, I fed them, take them to the vet when they get sick or for check-ups, buy them treats and the occasional toy. I bought an expensive carrying bag for the one time one had to go on a plane. What I am saying is I spend some money on these felines. And while this world is filled with pets who are neglected or abused, there are quite a few pets (particularly dogs) who are pampered far more than my cats. Who have a lot more money spent on them. What if that money didn't go to dogs and cats and other pets? What if, instead, all that money went to Oxfam (or wherever)? How many humans could have basic needs met? And yet many people, many people who claim that humans always come first, have made the choice to give a certain animal a well cared for life. And that's just pets. What about the people who spend lots of money keeping classic cars running well, looking after musical instruments, preserving odd buildings, maintaining gardens that don't even provide food, and on and on. People always say that they would choose the infant or the human and yet daily many of us don't make that choice.
And this is important, because almost all of us have chosen to spend time and money on developing relationships and supporting the well-being of nonhumans, and that money and time could be spent directly helping humans. So, when Bennett says human's health and lives are more important, what does that mean? Does that mean when the philosopher asks the abstract question: A Picasso or an infant, we all say an infant? If so it's an empty promise. Things are already more complicated. We are, as Adrian points out, already entangled. Already bound up in so many obligations and commitments and loves and relationships. To think ethically will mean to think from this situated entanglements. I think in our intellectual circles such practical ethics have gotten a bad rap. People want to replace rigorous ethics with strictly intuitive jumps at that moment. Intuition matters, but rigorous ethics will always help transform and shape our conatus, our desire and intuition (one might start thinking here of an intuitive method in the sense that Deleuze speaks of in his work on Bergson).

A Post of Links

Craig has a copy of his paper up, "What's so Critical About Critical Animal Studies". Hopefully a longer response from me is forthcoming.

Adrian and Peter both have responses to my comments about Bennett's ch. 7. Adrian is here, and Peter is here. Thanks to both of them for their comments. I do plan to post on chapter 8 and also the book as a whole within this coming week. I know that is a week late, and I want to thank both of them for keeping the reading group focused and on time. Also, Adrian has a final wrap up here.

Ben Woodard and Tim Morton have a new journal, Thinking Nature. The first CFP is here. I like the title of the journal, it has wonderful double meaning. Both thinking about nature, but also nature that thinks. Nature becomes both a subject and object of thinking, which is pretty great.

Lastly, My Brightest Diamond performing the classic, "Feeling Good." From the amazing compilation album, Dark was the Night.

Thoughts on Bennett, ch. 7

Sorry for missing making comments on a couple of chapters there, but I don't want to backtrack too much. So, some comments on chapter 7 now, and then later this week some comments on chapter 8 and the book as a whole. Also, before I get into this make sure you read APS's post on this chapter (and the discussion, featuring Adrian among others).

Chapter seven, on political ecology, didn't clarify the issues I hoped would be. Indeed, the chapter reflected both the positive and frustrating aspects of the book. First, I won't get into it here, but her readings pushing both Dewey and Ranciere into a stronger anti-anthropocentric vibe are wonderful. For those sections alone I would suggest this chapter (especially if you have any interest in those two thinkers). But her own commitment to being anti-anthropocentric struggles in this chapter. Or, as I put it before, her commitment to a certain type of anti-anthropocentrism (in ontology and policy) seems to not also mean an escaping a certain humanism (an anthropocentrism in ethics and politics, if you will). That's the only way I can possibly understand her claiming at one point in this chapter that we need to move beyond an human exceptionalism, and her claims that certain human interests will always come first and that humans must play an executive role in the world. So, while obviously supportive of the first move (the need to get rid of human exceptionalism) I think we need to spend some time with these last two claims.
In a footnote Bennett claims "this fermentation seems to require some managing to ensure, for example, that all the ingredients are in the pot. It seems to require humans to exercise this 'executive' function" (p. 150 n. 19). This seems to lay in conjunction with her claim that:

For while every public may very well be an ecosystem, not every ecosystem is democratic. And I cannot envision any polity so egalitarian that important human needs, such as health or survival, would not take priority.
Why not? Since I have challenged the uniqueness of humanity in several ways, why not conclude that we and they are equally entitled? Because I have not eliminated all differences between us but examined instead the affinities across these differences, affinities that enable the very assemblages explored in the present book. To put it bluntly, my conatus will not let me "horizontalize" the world completely. I also identify with members of my species, insofar as they are bodies most similar to mine. (p. 104)

Okay, let's parse this position. Bennett wishes to tap the breaks on her movement towards egalitarianism. Whatever else she may have led us to believe, humans are still firmly in the driver's seat. Now, this doesn't just mean that we have greater responsibilities, but like all executives we get more perks, too. So, whatever she has said about enabling instrumentalizations from before, this is a fairly classical move: Deontology for humans, utilitarianism for everything else. Now, this may be unfair, but it is hard to read this in another way. Maybe I am being too quick to think that phrase "important human needs" is fairly useless qualifier, not nearly strong enough ethical, politically, or ontologically to actually protect nonhumans. Her justification for this human exceptionalism is perhaps the worse part: Her conatus makes her. Seriously? Maybe Bennett needs a new conatus. There is nothing her to explain why species difference is an ontologically, ethically, and/or politically important difference or coherent category. My cat is obviously not the same as myself, but my female partner is also obviously not the same as myself. There are plenty of times when we do not flatten out differences but still demand egalitarianism and democracy. Racists who had bothered to read Spinoza might talk about how they can't support egalitarianism because ultimately their conatus makes them support people of the same race because they are more similar. Or class, sex, nation, what have you. It speaks of the profound anthropocentricism of the world that we think people can simply slot in the word species and not suffer from similar issues as if they had said race, sex, class, etc.
Again, this may seem as if I am being too hard on Bennett. so let me clarify. I may find this move disappointing, but I also don't have solutions here. I have occasionally been attacked as simply replacing an anthropocentrism with some sort of animal-centrism. Not entirely fair, but partially true. In that I think that figuring out how to integrate animals into our political and ethical systems is hard enough for now. I could say: Democracy for all! Which is fine if I simply want to work in slogans, but far more complex to actually have some sort of flat ethics. I have repeatedly come out that I worry that a flat ontology can justify its own humanism. I think this is one example of that.

The Story of Cap and Trade: A Rebuttal

I know I need to respond to some emails and comments still. I also need to get back on the summer reading group horse. But, here is an off-topic post anyway.

While I was at the wedding my brother brought up Annie Leonard's short animated film, "The Story of Cap and Trade." Now, I know that I am well behind the curve here, but I hadn't seen the film before. So, I know that for many of you this is already a decided and done issue one way or another. I am also sure there are probably several more thorough responses out there, and maybe I should have just searched for them and linked here. Regardless, this video both angered and worried me, and I felt it deserved a direct response since I have come across it.

It angered me for the way it depicts supporters of cap and trade. Leonard at least implies (if not quite argues) that cap and trade was somehow developed by evil market speculators; like Enron, Goldman Sachs, and Bernie Madoff (wtf on this last one); and that supporters of cap and trade are either dupes or complicit co-conspirators in some new speculative bubble that puts all of us in danger. Whatever your feelings about the effectiveness of cap and trade to handle the problem of rapid global climate change, let's me honest: there are many tireless activists and policy wonks who are fighting for cap and trade and they are not delusional, duped, greedy, or complicit. And many of them not only think cap and trade is the best thing we can get through Congress, they think that a well designed cap and trade program is an essential component of any bill to fight global warming. You can disagree with them without turning them into villains or idiots. Many people on the right, like the Heritage Foundation, are opposed to cap and trade, but I don't claim that Annie Leonard is in league or been duped by the far right. It would be both irresponsible and mean-spirited to do so.

So, cap and trade doesn't get birthed from speculative traders, where does it come from? You won't learn this in something called The Story of Cap and Trade, so let me elucidate. The original cap and trade system was first installed in the 1990 Clean Air Act (which is valorized in this program). If you remember at the time there was a fear of Acid Rain caused by too much production of SO2 and NOx. Both SO2 and NOx were put under a cap and trade program, and it was an amazing success. Levels were reduced far more quickly than anticipated, and for far less than anticipated. We have seen this idea expanded to carbon in the European Union in 2005 and in a regional program in the Northeast US.

What does all of this tell us? It tells us that cap and trade was invented by scientists and policy wonks, it has a record of success and models that we can investigate to make better policy, and it seems politically feasible. The roles of speculative marketers to promote cap and trade are rather marginal to this story, whereas they are central to the story that Leonard tells.

So, that's why it angers me, it worries me because Leonard's video frequently misleads or tells only part of the story. I think if we who are concerned about the environment and ecology depend on information like this, we cannot begin to have the sort of conversations necessary to figure out what is best. So, here are some responses to her video:

(1) It seems to be working in Europe. Leonard points out how rocky the beginning of cap and trade was in Europe. It did result in price fluctuations, and too many permits were given away at the beginning. However, Europe's system was designed in phases, so that things could be fixed. And sure enough, since Phase II began in 2007, things have gotten better. As this German Marshall Fund report (.pdf) explains, much of Europe is set to meet their Kyoto goals because of cap and trade. Indeed, cap and trade seems to be reducing between 2.5 and 5% of carbon annually from Europe. Moreover, prices have largely stabilized.

(2) I think everyone agrees that fully auctioned permits is the best idea for cap and trade. It is unclear from the video if Leonard would be for a system that had fully auctioned permits and strong regulations on offsets. She nowhere says she would be, even though her two concrete problems with cap and trade can be fixed by stronger bills, they are not inherent to the system itself. Anyway, fully auctioned credits would be best. The bill that passed the House a while back, Waxman-Markey, took a hybrid approach to this issue. It gives away most of the permits to begin with, and then gives away less and less of them over time. Moreover, most of permits given away are given away to protect consumer interests, not polluter interests. Would a fully auction system be better? Of course! But better for what? For reducing carbon? That seems unlikely, the cap is the main thing that decides that. So, the auctioned credits are a way of raising revenue, and that strikes most of us as important and good. But it is unclear why Leonard implies that it would make matters worse for the planet if we gave away permits rather than auctioning them off.

(3) The issue of offsets is one that I share a certain amount of skepticism over. And in this case I can see why a system with bad or unregulated offsets might make a system that is worse (though hard to see how it is worse than the status quo) but at least a system that wouldn't be effective enough. My understanding is that Waxman-Markey do a lot to make sure that offsets are abused. This is something I don't know nearly enough about, and am open to learning more. I do know that one of the reasons that offsets are seen as a possible benefit is to jumpstart international action. Basically companies in the US could bribe countries and companies in the rest of the world to act in ways that are important for lowering carbon emissions. To install methane captures and to stop destroying rain forests. But this is something I am skeptical of, and not fully on board with.

(4) Leonard implies that the US starting to tackle carbon emissions itself will somehow undermine international cooperation. I don't even begin to understand this argument. How can us showing that we are serious about tackling carbon emissions make us less serious on the international scene? Wouldn't the opposite be true? Moreover, how do any of her solutions help international confidence? Paul Krugman has suggested two ways with dealing with carbon emissions in the other world (this whole article is worth reading). The first is that if we set up an international market for the cap and trade, then countries that produce less carbon would have more permits to sell. In short, companies form the EU and US would pay companies in China, India, Brazil, etc not to produce carbon. A fairly direct bribery scheme. Another possibility is to enact carbon tariffs. Neither of these are perfect solutions, but I remain confused how focusing on passing a workable national cap and trade program is a distraction from international solutions.

(5) Leonard makes two more arguments for cap and trade as dangerous distraction. The first is that the EPA can somehow cap carbon emissions. Well, it can regulate carbon as a pollutant, but it is unclear how it can cap industry specific carbon emissions. Moreover, the EPA's enforcement will be up for grabs each time the white house changes hands. A law that compels enforcement and sets specific guidelines for caping is far more effective for large scale and continuous change. Now, it is true that some of the cap and trade bills proposed will weaken the EPA's ability to regulate carbon unilateritality. That's not great, but if we get a strong enough bill out of congress it will be worth it. The other argument is that it will make people complacent. If we are actually caping carbon, I don't understand what you want people to be doing. Now, there are ecological issues outside of rapid global climate change, but I don't see how a carbon cap and trade will make us care less about those issues. It is true that an effective cap and trade destroys the meaning of individual actions when it comes to carbon. Deciding to produce less carbon will (seldom) matter because if you produce less it gives room for someone else to produce more. This is either a feature or a bug of the system, depending on who you are. Either you feel this will destroy individual morality, or you feel that a system that doesn't require self-conscious sacrifice but systematic changes is a better thing is up in the air from an ethical perspective. From a getting stuff done perspective, I'd prefer an effective systematic changes.

(6) Cap with no trade strikes me as somewhat problematic. First of all, I don't see the added benefit. If the caps are the same, we would be reducing carbon at the same rate. On the other hand, without trade it would produce much higher costs on consumers. That has its own set of problems. Also, just as I am wary of an unregulated market, I am also wary of the government, of centralized planning. I think we need a system that allows a degree of flexibility internally with a hard cap externally. I guess being for cap without trade makes sense if you are inherently opposed to all markets. The fact that Leonard only speaks in terms of ponzi schemes, bubbles, etc. makes it clear that she seems opposed to all speculative markets. I'm not sure I am, or at least certainly not to the degree I'd be for giving up an effective global warming opposition. As Paul Krugman explains why cap and trade doesn't lend itself to the sort of speculation that Leonard's language emphasis. Seriously, being opposed to the trade of cap and trade only makes sense if you are opposed to all trading, to the trading of wheat futures for example. Also, there is has been no gaming the market system of SO2 cap and trade (.pdf), and no evidence of any gaming the US regional carbon cap and trade (.doc). I don't know about problems of gaming the EU system, and if any of you know I'd be interested. Ultimately my view of markets are similar as those put forward by Braudel in Capitalism and Civilization and Delanda's Braudelian view in A Thousand Years of Non-Linear History. Basically, that markets are powerful and productive. The real problem isn't with markets, but with anti-markets trying to pass themselves off as markets. The creation of an actual market with cap and trade strikes me as beneficial addition to the policy.

At the end, this is a complex issue. Leonard is right that some of the people who first devised cap and trade to handle acid rain are worried about its effectiveness to handle carbon. There are a lot of problems and potholes to be dealt with. But "The Story of Cap and Trade" seems more devoted to rallying troops than it does to grapple with complex issues. That's not at all what we need.